Saudi Arabia, cause of
Salafism, extremism

A former official at the United Nations and professor of international law stressed that Saudi Arabia is expanding Salafism that "inspired terrorist organizations and political agendas."

Qodsna (Tehran) - "Saudi Arabian security is also linked to sectarian identity, not only to give hegemonic legitimacy to its particular version of Islam but to express its view that Shi’ism is responsible for turmoil and strife throughout the region, and is the basis of Iranian influence beyond its borders," Richard A. Falk said in an exclusive interview with Qods News Agency.

Richard Anderson Falk is the author or co-author of 20 books and the editor or co-editor of another 20 volumes. In 2008, the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) appointed Falk to a six-year term as a United Nations Special Rapporteur on "the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967”.

The following is the full text of the Interview:

Qodsna: What is the role of Saudi Arabia in the structure of countries like Iraq, Syria, Yemen, or even Lebanon?

There is little doubt that Saudi Arabia seeks to spread its influence throughout the Middle East, both to enhance the regime stability of the monarchy and to contain challenges of Iran arising in the countries mentioned in the question. Saudi Arabian security is also linked to sectarian identity, not only to give hegemonic legitimacy to its particular version of Islam but to express its view that Shi’ism is responsible for turmoil and strife throughout the region, and is the basis of Iranian influence beyond its borders. These issues cause political controversy and explain external intervention in the four countries mentioned. In each one Iran is perceived by the Saudi government as blocking national ambitions in Riyadh to be the regional leader, but also of the perceived threats to Saudi security and legitimacy. The Islamic Republic of Iran is seen by Saudi Arabia as being not only a challenge to Sunni dominance of Islamic allegiance and identity in the region but also as an abiding threat to domestic security due to the strategic presence in the society of discontented and radicalized Shi’ite minorities and by Shi’ite insistence, clearly articulated by Ayatollah Khomeini, that monarchy is not compatible with Islamic values.

Qodsna: Given the fact that Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE obey the US policies, what is your assessment of the current dispute among them?

It is a mistake to assume that the U.S. controls all aspects of Gulf country behavior. I believe that Saudi Arabia and UAE were disturbed by what they regarded as Qatar’s independent line of political behavior that collided with their policy preferences. These governments wanted there to be unity of purpose and policy with Gulf Cooperation Policy under their reactionary leadership and opposed Qatar’s normalized relations with Iran, their openness to giving asylum and diplomatic support to Muslim Brotherhood leaders and prominent Hamas leaders living in exile, as well as their relative openness to ‘modernity’ with regard to freedom of expression and independent media, particularly Aljazeera, which carried articles that were critical of Saudi Arabia and the UAE in relation to the Syrian strife and otherwise. From available information, the U.S. never was comfortable with this split among Gulf countries, except at the very outset when the Saudi anti-Qatar received the obviously ill-considered blessings, President Trump. Shortly afterward, the U.S. Government shifted its tone, using it diplomatic leverage to encourage reconciliation. It is plausible to believe that U.S. influence discouraged more aggressive moves against Qatar. The large U.S. Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar undoubtedly was a factor leading Washington to seek accommodation and at the same time discouraging the Saudi/UAE led coalition to make a serious effort to implement their reported intention to achieve regime-change in Doha. It is likely that the Biden presidency will persist in its efforts to restore harmony among the Gulf monarchies.

Qodsna: What reasons caused the shift of Arab world leadership from Egypt, Syria, and Iraq to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar? What were its effects?

Egypt, Syria, and Iraq exhibit national situations that each have their own special features generating distinct atmospheres of national emergency. At the same time, they share all-consuming preoccupations associated with domestic turmoil, strife, and conflict within their respective countries. These crisis situations absorb the energies of the political leadership of these governments. It is hardly surprising that the search for stability at home takes precedence over the regional agenda. As well, these countries are not as worried as are Saudi Arabia and the UAE by Iranian expanded influence in the region, or particularly threatened by anti-Sunni sectarianism. In contrast, as suggested above, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are relatively stable domestically and give greater attention to developments with the regional context of the Middle East. Qatar seems differently motivated and can be best understood as asserting its independence as a sovereign state, overcome being in the shadows cast by its larger neighbor, and thus using its wealth and political imagination to overcome its subordinate and mini-state status, which it did so successfully as to provoke Saudi and Emirate elites.

Qodsna: What are the reasons for the current regional security and political crises in the Middle East?

There are four principal reasons; first, the various regional reverberations of the Iranian Revolution that has generated since 1979 a counterrevolutionary series of responses led, and even financed by Saudi Arabia and regional allies, and strongly endorsed by Israel and the United States. Each of these political actors has their own motivations and priorities, as well as parallel policies; secondly, the regionally destabilizing impacts of the Arab Uprisings of 2011, and the various efforts to reverse, or at least neutralize, those challenges directed at the established economic and political order. As well, the severe and prolonged civil strife in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and Libya have offered opportunities for intervention that have caused a series of proxy wars; thirdly, the U.S./UK attack and regime-changing occupation of Iraq in 2003, intensifying sectarian tensions and contributing to political extremism, dramatized by the rise of ISIS, and transnational terrorism; fourthly, the reaction to these developments in Iran magnified interventionary diplomacy in Syria and Yemen, oppression in Egypt, and led to unlawful military actions by Israel in Syria and induced the U.S. to promote the destabilization of Iran by covert actions and sanction maintained during the COVID pandemic despite acute adverse humanitarian consequences. The United States and Israel have given a high priority to curbing Iranian influence in relation to Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and more recently, Lebanon. 

Qodsna: What is your opinion about the role of the Persian Gulf Arab countries in the formation of terrorist groups?

I am not an expert on this topic, nor is it easy to assess, given the role of secret and disguised behavior of Persian Gulf Arab countries. For many years, Saudi Arabia invested many billions in support of madrassas in Asian Sunni countries that encouraged Salafi versions of political extremism that inspired terrorist organizations and political agendas and also led to an increased reliance on state terrorist tactics and weaponry in carrying on counterterrorist warfare regionally. It is my impression that the lower profile military engagement by the U.S. during the Trump presidency led the Gulf Arab governments to be more regionally cautious, seemingly worried about escalation, and full-fledged regional war. Illustrative of a more cautious Gulf style of confrontation was the muted response to the drone attack attributed to Yemen, but with Iranian weaponry and alleged support on the state-owned Saudi Aramco oil processing facilities located at Abqaiq in eastern Saudi Arabia. Whether Biden will revive American participation in the Nuclear Program Agreement in Iran, ending sanctions, will affect how Persian Gulf Arab governments deal with anti-Iranian terrorist organizations. As always, expectations about such behavior should be tentative as many uncertainties loom on the road ahead.  

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