Gharibabadi: You Cannot Bomb Safeguarded Facilities and Claim Ambiguity Against Iran

Kazem Gharibabadi emphasized several key points on the X social network regarding the recent report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the media remarks made by its Director General concerning the lack of access to certain damaged facilities, the status of uranium stockpiles, and the issue known as the "loss of continuity of knowledge" in Iran's nuclear program:

"First, Mr. Grossi speaks of 'ambiguity,' 'lack of access,' and 'loss of continuity of knowledge'; however, this situation did not manifest in a vacuum. Nuclear facilities under safeguards were targeted by military attacks from the United States and the Israeli regime. The Director General of the Agency, who has demonstrated that he is completely at the disposal of the United States and the West, unfortunately never condemned these attacks. One cannot ignore the source of the disruption and then frame the consequence of that very disruption against Iran.

Second, if the issue is verification and non-proliferation, the primary expectation from the Agency's Director General is to take an explicit and legal stance against the attack on safeguarded facilities. Such an attack is not only a violation of Iran's sovereignty; it is a direct blow to nuclear safety, the safeguards system, and the credibility of the non-proliferation regime. Does the Director General have the audacity to finally take a stance against this action by the U.S., which violates international law and the UN Charter? With this political approach and dependency, how can this individual—who is also a candidate for UN Secretary-General—manage this crucial organization independently and professionally?!

Third, repeating the figure '60 percent' and outlining hypothetical scenarios regarding weapons without an exact explanation of the legal framework is more political than technical. The NPT does not mandate a numerical ceiling for enrichment percentages; the legal criterion is the non-diversion of nuclear materials and activities toward military purposes. Iran's nuclear program is peaceful, and Iran has acted within the framework of its legal commitments.

Fourth, the Agency cannot simultaneously report the effects of a military attack, bypass the responsibility of its perpetrators, and demand that Iran pay the technical and political cost of the insecurity created by the aggressors. This is neither verification nor confidence-building.

Fifth, if the Agency wants to be part of a diplomatic solution, it must avoid turning a technical report into a tool for political pressure. Safeguards are not strengthened by military action, threats, and drafting resolutions; they are strengthened by neutrality, adherence to international law, respect for the sovereignty of states, and the explicit condemnation of attacks on facilities monitored by the Agency.

Sixth, you cannot bomb safeguarded facilities, destroy the access and safety required for inspections, and then use the consequences of that very attack as an ambiguity against Iran."